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Abstract
i
ABSTRACT 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (S-O Act) of 2002 requires principal officers to certify under oath 
to the veracity of information contained in SEC filings and opine on the effectiveness of 
the internal control system. This study examines the determinants and contents of 
corporate voluntary disclosure of management’s responsibilities during the five-year 
period preceding the S-O Act. We predict that the voluntary disclosure of management’s 
responsibilities for financial information signals certain incentives and characteristics of 
the reporting firm that are relevant to financial statement users and regulators. Consistent 
with our predictions, our findings reveal significant differences between issuing and non-
issuing firms as to the effectiveness of an individual firm’s internal control system, access 
to capital markets, audit committee characteristics, and ownership structure. An empirical 
analysis of the contents of these assertions also reveals different areas of emphasis and 
selectivity by management, which represents an informative link to existing disclosure 
mandates. The results of this study contribute to our knowledge of management’s 
motivations for voluntary disclosure and lend credence to the mandatory certification 
requirements and related disclosure reforms established in the post-Enron era.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (S-O Act) of 2002 requires the principal executive and financial 
officers of each publicly owned company to certify the veracity of information contained in SEC 
filings and opine on the effectiveness of the internal control system.  The Section 302 quarterly 
certifications require a number of assertions by CEOs and CFOs, including a requirement to 
report on the effectiveness of the design and operation of the company’s disclosure controls, their 
responsibilities thereon, and to report significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in controls 
to the external auditor and audit committee. Likewise, Section 404 requires senior executives to 
report annually on their responsibilities for and effectiveness of the company’s internal controls 
and procedures and disclose any material weaknesses. 
 
The S-O legislation was preceded by a protracted and contentious debate over the benefits 
and ramifications of disclosures concerning management’s responsibilities for financial 
reporting. For almost 30 years, formal reporting remained non-mandatory, but senior 
management at many publicly traded companies had voluntarily published a “Report of 
Management’s Responsibility” (RMR)1 in annual shareholder reports. This study analyzes the 
determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure of RMRs prior to the S-O Act and examines 
management’s assertions disclosed in those voluntary RMRs.2 Our findings serve as an 
informative “bridge” between these two eras and provide additional insights into the ongoing 
debate of mandatory versus voluntary disclosure. Indeed, a recent study by Financial Executives 
International (FEI 2005) of Section 404 disclosures reported “considerable variation in 
management’s reports” (p. 5), and that “many firms added specific voluntary disclosures about 
internal control and ethics initiatives” (p.19). Also, the SEC’s “Advisory Committee on Smaller 
Public Companies” (Advisory Committee 2006, pp.6-7) has recommended a “tiered approach” to 
Section 404 reporting that would partially or totally exempt certain smaller public companies 
(based on market capitalization) from these requirements.3
1 Other titles used to describe these disclosures include “Report of Management,” “Management Report on Financial 
Statements,” and “Management’s Responsibility for Financial Reporting.” In this study, the abbreviation “RMR” is 
used. 
2 Our tests focus primarily on characteristics of firms using RMRs as a disclosure policy.  However, to gain more 
insights into management’s incentives to issue an RMR, we also identify and analyze a subset of first-time issuers. 
Anecdotal evidence and conversations with several chief executive officers and audit partners reveal that the 
decision to issue an RMR emanates from management, although consultation with the company’s auditors and 
lawyers is not uncommon.    
3 The Advisory Committee was formed by the SEC in March 2005 in order to examine the burdens on smaller public 
companies resulting from U.S. securities laws (particularly those related to the S-O Act) and to propose solutions to 
these concerns (Advisory Committee 2006, p.1). 
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Investors and accounting policy regulators demand relevant and reliable information from 
public firms that is useful in making rational investment decisions. In satisfying investors’ needs 
for information, firms tend to disclose the minimum-required information, with voluntary 
disclosures provided on a cost-benefit basis. Accordingly, the voluntary disclosure of an RMR 
signals certain characteristics and incentives of the reporting firm. These characteristics and 
incentives shape the content and nature of management’s assertions when publicly declaring its 
responsibilities to the users of financial statements as well as regulators. Since RMRs usually 
include management assertions on the firm’s internal control effectiveness, audit committee, and
external auditor, issuing an RMR provides users of financial statements with an additional tool in 
assessing the credibility and transparency of the firm’s reported accounting information.  
Exploring the characteristics and incentives of firms that provide voluntary disclosure of 
management responsibilities for financial reporting enhances users’ understanding of an entity’s 
reporting strategy and presents users with additional information to consider in assessing the 
accuracy and completeness of such financial disclosures. We predict that management’s decision 
to voluntarily issue an RMR is influenced by a number of factors, including effective internal 
controls, profitability, corporate governance structure, and access to capital markets. An effective 
internal control system provides assurances for adherence to established operating and financial 
policies, thereby reducing the likelihood of errors and fraud.  Therefore, firms with effective 
internal controls are less likely to restate their financials or face SEC enforcement actions, and 
thus are more likely to issue an RMR. 
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Abbott et al. 2000; Beasley et al. 2000), we also 
recognize that effective governance mechanisms, such as independent and active audit 
committees, are essential ingredients for effective internal controls and operating systems.  
Accordingly, we predict that audit committees dominated by outside members and that meet 
frequently can positively influence executives’ confidence in the financial statements and their 
willingness to opine on them. To reduce investors’ concern for information asymmetry, firms 
with extensive need for external financing have more incentives to provide expanded disclosures. 
Therefore, we predict that firms with frequent issuances of debt and equity capital are more likely 
to issue an RMR. We also predict that the issuance of an RMR is associated with a firm’s 
profitability and ownership structure. 
 
Consistent with our predictions, univariate tests disclose differences between RMR 
issuers and non-issuers as to the effectiveness of the firm’s internal control system, access to 
capital markets, audit committee characteristics, and ownership structure.  The logistic regression 
results also support several of the predictions. Management’s decision to issue an RMR is 
associated with the effectiveness of a firm’s internal controls, where RMR firms have a lower 
probability of financial fraud relative to non-RMR firms. Our findings also show the decision to 
issue an RMR is positively related to the frequency of debt issuance, confirming the prediction 
that reporting firms use RMRs to signal transparency in their financial reporting to market 
participants.  The results also indicate that corporate governance structure, in particular the 
presence of an active and independent audit committee, has a positive effect on management’s 
decision to issue an RMR. Additional analysis on a sub-sample of first-time issuers produced 
results consistent with the above findings.  
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Our second set of tests in the paper focuses on an empirical analysis of RMR content 
among issuing firms. The findings reveal different areas of emphasis on assertions by senior 
management. Although almost all reporting firms (92%) assert that management is responsible 
for the preparation and integrity of financial statements, only 36% acknowledge management’s 
responsibility for the system of internal controls.  As important, only 41% expressed an opinion 
on the effectiveness of the internal control system and only 24% included discussions of the 
inherent limitations of internal controls. Cross-sectional analysis among issuers reveals that firm-
specific RMR assertions are influenced by profitability, leverage, and audit committee 
independence.   
 
The study holds interesting implications for policymakers and individual users of 
financial statements.  From a policy standpoint, the study provides empirical evidence to inform 
the ongoing debate on whether financial disclosure could be left to firm-specific (voluntary) 
incentives or subject to mandatory regulation. Noting that mandated disclosures may not be 
necessary, Kothari (2001) argues that a firm can achieve an optimal level of firm disclosure by 
trading off the costs and benefits of the disclosures they are willing to make. Others have argued 
that investors need some basic information if they are to exercise their rights and, thus, 
mandatory disclosure requirements ought to be a primary feature of well-developed capital 
markets (La Porta et al. 2000).  
 
The findings of this study suggest that the willingness of firms to issue RMRs and the 
level and nature of assertions made may indeed signal management’s uncertainty or concerns 
over certain financial reporting or internal control matters.  In this instance, the data seem to be 
consistent with the requirement for the uniform certifications by public companies under the S-O 
Act.  Additionally, the results of the study shed light on the firm-specific environment in which 
the new certification provisions can better achieve their objectives. 
 
2.  EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS CONCERNING RMR ISSUERS 
 
2.1  Effective Internal Controls 
 
RMRs reveal important information concerning the completeness and accuracy of 
financial information and provide insight into the components and effectiveness of a company’s 
internal control structure.  Accordingly, these voluntary assertions expose management to a 
higher level of accountability for the financial statements and related disclosures. In order to 
credibly make such assertions, top management must rely on the quality and strength of the 
company’s internal control structure.4 Kinney (2000), Krishnan (2005) and other researchers 
discuss the demand and  
importance of quality internal controls but acknowledge difficulty (prior to the S-O Act) in 
assessing such information without formal reporting by companies. 
4 Prior research (Carcello et al. 2002; McMullen 1996) as well as the U.S. Auditing Standards (AICPA 1999, AU 
Section 319) acknowledges that larger entities are more likely than smaller firms to possess elements of effective 
internal controls such as a written code of conduct, written policy manuals, an appropriate segregation of duties, and 
an internal audit function. In addition, accounting disclosure regulators (FASB, SEC) are also sensitive to the 
burdens and associated costs of increased disclosure on smaller firms (Lang and Lundholm 1993). However, since 
our sample reflects a matched-pair design by size, the size effect is common to all tested firms. 
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Like Krishnan (2005), we use a firm’s restatement of its financial statements and SEC 
enforcement actions as a measure of internal control effectiveness. Based on this argument, it is 
more likely that RMR firms will have fewer financial statement restatements and fewer SEC 
enforcement actions. 
 
2.2  Profitability 
 
Though research exploring the relationship between firm performance and disclosure has 
displayed mixed results and may be situation specific, management may “tend to be more 
forthcoming when the firm is performing well than when it is performing poorly” (Lang and 
Lundholm 1993, pp.248-249).  Proponents of RMRs contend that such disclosures reflect 
favorably on management’s successful stewardship over the firm and are a positive signal to 
investors and other parties that maintain a contractual relationship with the firm (Kinney 2000; 
Willis and Lightle 2000).  Accordingly, executives of profitable firms may have a higher 
propensity for issuing an RMR to signal their organizational success and enhance their reputation 
as effective stewards.   
 
In contrast, one may argue that if managers use RMRs to provide such signals, firms with 
lower profitability may have greater incentives to do so to reduce investor uncertainty by 
clarifying their operating policies and processes. This later argument is consistent with a negative 
relationship between the issuance of RMRs and profitability. Since these arguments suggest that 
there are competing profitability motives for the issuance of an RMR, this paper attempts to 
determine the underlying relationship between profitability and the issuance of an RMR with no 
directional prediction.  
 
2.3  Asymmetry of Information and Cost of Capital  
 
Management possesses better access to knowledge concerning the firm’s financial 
position and performance than outsiders do. Further, firms with limited internal financing and 
unable to avail themselves of low-cost external financing may be forced to forgo profitable 
investment opportunities. Therefore, extant theory predicts that firms that plan to tap the capital 
markets have an incentive to provide voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and 
reduce the firm’s cost of external financing (Aboody et al. 2004; Healy and Palepu 2001).  
Sengupta (1998) adds that higher disclosure quality may reduce a lender’s perception of default 
risk, thereby lowering the yield on debt.  The quality or “informativeness” of disclosures can also 
lead to broader coverage by analysts and a lower overall cost of borrowing (Lang and Lundholm 
1996).  Lastly, firms that periodically enter the capital markets for financing are subject to 
scrutiny by rating agencies and other interested parties. 
 
Management’s assertions concerning financial information, internal control effectiveness, 
corporate governance and interaction with external auditors are vital to users of financial 
statements and regulators. Therefore, confident chief executives are more likely to disclose these 
important assertions in order to signal the reliability of reported information and possibly raise 
capital at lower cost. This argument leads to the following predictions:  RMR firms are more 
 
Empirical Predictions Concerning RMR Issuers 
5
highly leveraged, issue debt and equity capital more frequently, and are likely to exhibit a lower 
cost of debt financing than other firms.  
 
2.4  Corporate Governance 
 
The audit committee is the conduit that enables the board of directors to perform its 
oversight function with respect to accurate and reliable financial reporting, and serves as a 
critical link between the board, top management, external auditors, and the internal audit 
function.  Fama and Jensen (1983, p.19) posit that outside or independent board members are 
likely to be more effective in mitigating conflicts between managers and shareholders due to the 
“separation of top-level decision management and [decision] control,” and also face reputation 
risks as prominent business leaders.  
 
Empirical studies (Beasley et al. 2000; Beasley 1996; McMullen and Raghunandan 
1996a) have disclosed that companies with financial reporting problems are less likely to have an 
audit committee dominated by outside directors, and few meet more than three times per year.  
Similarly, Beasley et al. (1999, pp.16-17) find that only 38 percent of firms experiencing 
fraudulent financial reporting during 1987-1997 had audit committees comprised entirely of 
outside directors and that most averaged approximately two meetings per year.  Prior research 
has also shown that audit committees that meet more frequently and are comprised of non-
employee directors can deter the use of aggressive accounting practices by management (Abbott 
et al. 2000; Parker 1999).  Given this discussion, we posit that independent5 and active6 audit 
committees are likely to present an acute influence over senior management’s decision to publish 
an RMR.  
2.5  Other Factors 
 
The literature on corporate policy decisions indicates that ownership structure is a 
significant determinant of voluntary disclosure decisions by firms. Different classes of owners 
exercise disparate roles in monitoring corporate policies and decisions. For instance, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p.67) suggest that institutional investors and those “who possess comparative 
advantages in these activities” are likely to be important monitors of management’s behavior.  
As investors, institutional owners face a fiduciary responsibility over the funds provided by 
individuals and often undertake an active role in monitoring management’s performance.  
Accordingly, a higher concentration of institutional ownership in a particular firm is likely to 
motivate management to provide additional voluntary disclosures in order to maintain investor 
confidence (El-Gazzar 1998).  Bushee and Noe (2000) also comment that institutional owners  
 
5 In this study, characteristics that delineate “independent” versus “inside” directors follow the criteria used by 
Beasley et al. (1999).  In that study (p.16), an independent director was defined as one with “no disclosed 
relationship (other than stock ownership) between the director and the company or its officers.”  Conversely (p.16), 
inside or affiliated directors include current or former officers and employees, consultants, those related to 
management, and those associated with major suppliers, customers, or creditors of the firm. 
6 Recent audit committee recommendations (Business Roundtable 2005, p.20; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999) 
suggest that a higher frequency of meetings (at least four or more) is necessary to improve effectiveness and enhance 
oversight responsibilities. 
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are “sensitive” to disclosure if such information serves to reduce the volatility of stock prices, 
enhances profitable trading opportunities, and offers additional insight into corporate governance 
practices. Based on this argument, we predict a positive relationship between the magnitude of 
institutional ownership of a company and senior management’s tendency to voluntarily issue an 
RMR. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also assert that higher firm ownership by management 
narrows the divergence between its interests and those of outside owners.  This closer alignment 
may relax senior management’s need to signal the fulfillment of its stewardship role to outside 
owners.  Accordingly, senior management at firms with higher levels of equity ownership by 
management (e.g., officers, directors, and other defined individuals) are less likely to offer 
voluntary information above that which is mandatory. This discussion is consistent with a 
negative relationship between the magnitude of managerial ownership of a company and senior 
management’s tendency to voluntarily issue an RMR. 
 
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN
 
3.1  Sample and Data  
 
To test the above predictions, this study uses a total random sample of 500 firms, 
distributed as 100 firms per year for the period 1996 to 2000, from the population of companies 
annually surveyed in the AICPA’s Accounting Trends and Techniques (ATT). ATT provides a 
supplemental classification of firms regarding their reporting on RMRs, which is fundamental to 
conduct the current research.7 The base sample was then screened against the following criteria: 
(1) data availability in COMPUSTAT; (2) completeness of data on audit committees’ structure 
and meetings; (3) confounding events including mergers and acquisitions, and (4) repeated 
companies. Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample selection and elimination process. From the 
screened sample, 192 firms were identified as RMR issuers.  
 
To alleviate a possible ATT membership bias towards large firms in our treatment sample, 
we matched the RMR issuers to a control sample of non-RMR issuers based on size, industry, 
and year from the general population of ATT and COMPUSTAT firms. We were unable to obtain 
this three-dimensional match for 14 companies.  Thus, our final matched-pairs sample consists of 
178 companies, as shown in Panel B of Table 1. Although our tests focus primarily on 
characteristics of firms using RMRs as a disclosure policy, we identify 24 first-time issuers from 
our sample.  Additional analysis was then conducted on these first-time issuers to learn more 
about management incentives in issuing an RMR.     
 
7 The ATT population includes a broad representation of industrial and service firms of diverse size from over 40 
industries. It also excludes banks, insurance firms, utilities and other sectors that possess unique financial 
characteristics or are subject to particular regulatory influences or incentives. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Sample Selection and Classification 
 
Panel A: Sample Reconciliation Number of Firms
Base sample (1996 – 2000)  500 
Sample Eliminations:   
1. Insufficient annual data from COMPUSTAT for the 
measuring variables 
 
37 
 
2. Missing audit committee information and other data due 
to mergers and acquisitions 
 
23 
 
3. Extreme observations  16  
4. Repeated firms 103 (179) 
5.   Non-Issuing firms   (129)
Issuing Firms  192
Panel B: Matched Pairs (Size, Industry, and Year) 
 
Issuing firms 192 
Less: Firms with no match  (14)
Matched-pairs: Issuing Firms  178 
Matched-pairs: Non-Issuing Firms  178
Final Sample 356
First Time Adopters  24
3.2  Model 
 
We employ two regression models to test our predictions. First, the logistic regression8
model (1) below is used to examine the influence of firm-specific characteristics on senior 
management’s decision to issue an RMR. Second, the OLS regression model (2) below is used to 
examine the relationship between the content (assertions) reported in RMRs and the explanatory 
variables, including company size.  
 
8 Logistic regression is appropriate for this portion of the study due to the binary nature of the dependent variable.  
For each observation, senior management either issues an RMR or not.  Essentially, logistic regression estimates the 
probability of this discrete decision given an array of explanatory variables (Hair et al. 1998, pp. 276-277). 
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3.3  Definitions of Variables 9
The measuring variables in models (1) and (2) above are defined below.  
 
Variable         
 
Description 
9 Data to calculate ROA, LTDE, AINT and SIZE was extracted from the COMPUSTAT database.  Data for 
AUDIND and AUDMET were collected from the examination of annual proxy statements.  Ownership percentages 
for INSTIT% and MANAG% were retrieved from Compact Disclosure.  ICEFF was identified from the 
COMPUSTAT and SEC databases.  FREQD and FREQS were obtained from Moody’s debt and equity records of 
new issues for the period of study. 
 
Dependent:
RMR  Report of Management’s Responsibility. This is a dichotomous variable 
that represents senior management’s disclosure decision.  RMR takes the 
value of 1 for firms that voluntarily reported on their responsibilities and 0 
otherwise. 
CONT  Content of RMR Assertions. We developed a disclosure index based upon  
the content of the firm’s RMR using an index of 30 assertions commonly  
found in such disclosures (see Table 5). CONT represents each firm’s actual 
number of assertions disclosed divided by the maximum number in the  
index.  CONTi = L of Firm i’s assertions / Maximum Number of Assertions in the Index. 
Independent:
ICEFF  A dummy variable where 1 represents a firm with a financial statement 
restatement or an SEC Enforcement Action, and 0 if not. 
ROA  A three-year average of the Return on Assets calculated as follows: 
 t = 0
ROA =   Net Income (continuing operations) + Interest Expense (after-tax)
t = -2 Total Assets    
FREQD  Number of new public debt issues in the test period (1996 to 2000). 
FREQS  Number of new equity issues in the test period (1996 to 2000). 
LTDE  Total long-term debt/stockholders’ equity at year-end. 
RMRi = 0 + 1 ICEFFi + 2 ROAi + 3 FREQDi + 4 FREQSi
+ 5 LTDEi + 6 AINTi + 7 AUDINDi + 8 AUDMETi
+ 9 INSTIT%i + 10 MANAG%i +  i (1) 
 
CONTi = 0 + 1 ICEFFi + 2 ROAi + 3 FREQDi + 4 FREQSi
+ 5 LTDEi + 6 AINTi + 7 AUDINDi + 8 AUDMETi
+ 9 INSTIT%i + 10 MANAG%i + 11 SIZEi +  i (2) 
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AINT  The average interest rate on the firm’s outstanding debt. 
 
AUDIND 
 
The percentage of independent to total audit committee members, where 
independence is defined as external members with no disclosed financial 
relationship (other than equity ownership) or employment with the firm. 
AUDMET  A dummy variable where 1 represents a firm with at least three audit 
committee meetings during the year, and 0 if not.  We use audit committee 
activity as a proxy for effectiveness.10 
INSTIT%  The percentage of voting shares owned by institutional owners at year-end. 
MANAG%  The percentage of voting shares owned by management such as officers, 
directors, and other defined individuals at year-end. 
SIZE  The natural log of total assets (in millions) at year-end. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
 
10 Prior research involving audit committee activity (e.g., Abbott et al. 2000; Parker 1999; Beasley et al. 1999) 
suggests that a threshold of at least three meetings per year was necessary during this time period for an audit 
committee to be deemed minimally effective.  In this study, we use this threshold to delineate effective (i.e., active) 
from ineffective audit committees.   
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the measuring variables for the total 
sample and the partitioned sample for RMR issuers and non-issuers.  Univariate tests of the 
differences in means are also presented and indicate clear demarcations between the two groups.  
RMR firms have on average a lower percentage of restatements of financial reports and SEC 
enforcement actions (p<0.05), providing support for our prediction concerning internal control 
effectiveness. Although not statistically significant, the profitability variable (ROA: return on 
assets) shows that the average net income per dollar of assets for reporting firms (.069) is higher 
than for the non-RMR firms (0.062).  The surrogates for capital market access and information 
asymmetry indicate that RMR firms issue public debt (FREQD) and equity (FREQS) more 
frequently (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively) than non-RMR firms and have higher leverage 
(LTDE); although the latter variable is not significant. This is consistent with our prediction that 
firms issue RMRs to signal the credibility of reported information for investors, thereby reducing 
information asymmetry in the marketplace.  
 
With respect to corporate governance, audit committee independence (AUDIND) and 
audit committee effectiveness (AUDMET) show that RMR issuers have a higher percentage of 
outside directors and meet more frequently than those of non-issuers, both statistically significant 
at p<0.01. The statistics on ownership structure disclose that RMR issuers have a greater 
percentage of equity owned by institutional investors (INSTIT%) but a lower percentage owned 
by management (MANAG%), both statistically significant at p<0.01. This result is consistent 
with the expectation that institutional investors exercise greater monitoring over investees, 
causing management to expand disclosure for stockholders. 
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As a sensitivity check, additional analysis of RMR first-time adopters was conducted. The 
results, as reported in Panel B of Table 2, confirm the effects of internal control effectiveness, 
access to capital markets, and corporate governance on management’s decision to issue an RMR. 
We find that first-time issuers have, on average, lower instances of restatements of financial 
statements or SEC enforcement actions (ICEFF). First time RMR firms also exhibit a higher 
frequency of public debt issuance (FREQD), more audit committee meetings (AUDMET), and a 
lower average interest rate on debt (AINT) than their matched non-RMR firms.  
 
The correlation matrix in Table 3 reveals low to moderate correlation between the 
explanatory variables.  A review of the Variance Inflation Factor for each variable reveals no 
significant multicollinearity.  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables and Group Differences 
 
Panel A:  Total Sample, RMR Issuers and Non-Issuers 
Variable Group Mean
Standard
Deviation
25th 
Percentile
50th 
Percentile
75% 
Percentile
Group Difference: 
Issuers – Non-Issuers
Z-Value (a) 
ICEFF All
Issuers 
Non-Issuers
0.17 
0.14 
0.21 
0.38 
0.35 
0.41 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-1.67 ** 
ROA All
Issuers
Non-Issuers
0.066
0.069
0.062
0.049 
0.051 
0.047 
0.040 
0.043 
0.033 
0.061 
0.067 
0.057 
0.089 
0.092 
0.085 
 
1.49  
FREQD All
Issuers
Non-Issuers
0.60 
0.78 
0.41 
0.87 
0.98 
0.71 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
 
4.10 *** 
FREQS All
Issuers
Non-Issuers
1.17 
1.39 
0.96 
1.86 
2.06 
1.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.00 
3.00 
2.00 
 
2.17 ** 
LTDE All
Issuers
Non-Issuers
0.81 
0.84 
0.78 
0.88 
0.94 
0.81 
0.27 
0.31 
0.20 
0.54 
0.55 
0.52 
1.05 
1.05 
1.04 
 
0.63  
AINT 
 
All
Issuers 
Non-Issuers
0.08 
0.07 
0.08 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
0.05 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
 
-0.59 
AUDIND All
Issuers
Non-Issuers
0.85 
0.89 
0.81 
0.24 
0.16 
0.30 
0.75 
0.75 
0.67 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
 
3.35 *** 
AUDMET 
 
All
Issuers
Non-Issuers
0.69 
0.79 
0.60 
0.46 
0.41 
0.49 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
 
4.02 *** 
INSTIT% 
 
All
Issuers
Non-Issuers
0.58 
0.61 
0.55 
0.23 
0.20 
0.25 
0.45 
0.53 
0.39 
0.62 
0.66 
0.59 
0.76 
0.76 
0.75 
 
2.88 *** 
MANAG% All
Issuers
Non-Issuers
0.09 
0.06 
0.13 
0.20 
0.14 
0.23 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.08 
0.04 
0.13 
 
-3.32 *** 
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(a) *, **, ***  Significant at  p < 0.10,  p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.  (ROA is based on a two-tailed test).  
Group differences in means for continuous variables are based on t-tests.  The between-group differences in location 
for the binary variables ICEFF and AUDMET are based upon the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test. 
See Section 3.3 for variable definitions. 
 
TABLE 2 (continued)
Panel B: First Time RMR Issuers and Matched Sample of Non-Issuers 
First-Time RMR Issuers (N=24) Matched Sample: Non-Issuers (N=24)
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Median Mean
Standard 
Deviation Median
Group 
Difference: 
 Z-Value (a)
ICEFF 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.21 0.41 0.00       -1.24 * 
ROA 0.073   0.039   0.063 0.060   0.039   0.063 1.13 
FREQD 1.13 1.15 1.00 0.29 0.55 0.00        3.19 ***
FREQS 1.75 1.59 2.00 1.50 1.91 0.00 0.49 
LTDE 0.68 0.58 0.55 0.66 0.79 0.38 0.03 
AINT 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07       -1.30 * 
AUDIND 0.89 0.21 1.00 0.81 0.28 1.00 1.17 
AUDMET 0.79 0.41 1.00 0.50 0.51 0.50      2.09 ** 
INSTIT% 0.67 0.19 0.67 0.60 0.23 0.63 1.04  
MANAG% 0.12 
 
0.20 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.02 0.62 
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TABLE 3
Pearson Pairwise Correlations of the Independent Variables
N = 356
ICEFF ROA FREQD FREQS LTDE AINT AUDIND AUDMET INSTIT% MANAG%
ICEFF 1.00
ROA -0.03 1.00
FREQD 0.03 -0.01 1.00
FREQS 0.02 0.02 0.10* 1.00
LTDE 0.04 -0.24** 0.02 0.03 1.00
AINT -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.01 1.00
AUDIND 0.05 0.11* 0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.10 1.00
AUDMET -0.02 0.02 0.13* 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.28** 1.00
INSTIT% 0.06 0.15** 0.17** 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.31** 0.25** 1.00
MANAG% -0.10* -0.04 -0.14** -0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.33** -0.24** -0.45** 1.00
*, ** Pearson correlation coefficients are significant at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively (two-tailed)
See Section 3.3 for variable definitions.
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4.2  Results of the Logit Model 
 
This section analyzes the results of the Logit multiple regression model and presents 
statistics on the relative influence of each factor in management’s decision on RMRs. Table 4 
presents the coefficient estimates of regressing management’s decision to issue RMRs against the 
explanatory variables.  Results are presented separately for the total sample (356 firms) and first-
time adopters (48 firms).   
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TABLE 4 
Logistic Regression Coefficients of the Explanatory Variables on RMR Issuance 
 
Coefficient  (Chi-square)  
Variable Expected Sign Total Sample First-Time Issuers 
Intercept 
 
? -1.79 
 (7.74) *** 
-0.82 
(0.08) 
ICEFF -  -0.63 
 (4.33) **  
-0.01 
(0.01) 
ROA +/-  3.42 
(1.93)  
14.48 
(0.61) 
FREQD +  0.45 
 (10.09) *** 
1.26 
 (3.94) ** 
FREQS +  0.09 
(2.20)  
-0.09 
(0.14) 
LTDE +  0.13 
 (0.87) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
AINT -  -0.45 
 (0.03)  
 -7.18 
(0.51) 
AUDIND 
 
+ 0.97
(3.09) * 
0.05 
(0.01) 
AUDMET 
 
+ 0.65
(6.21) ***  
2.05 
 (4.70) ** 
INSTIT% +  0.11 
(0.03) 
-1.76 
(0.39) 
MANAG% -  -1.31 
 (2.74) *  
-0.35 
(0.01) 
F Statistic  47.68 ***     20.04 ** 
Pseudo R2 12%  35% 
Sample size  356 firms 48 firms 
The Wald (Chi-square) statistic is indicated in parentheses 
*, **, *** Coefficient statistically significant at p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.  (ROA is based on a 
two-tailed test).                                                                                                                                                            
See Section 3.3 for variable definitions.
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The results for the total sample in Table 4 show that the coefficient of the internal control 
effectiveness (ICEFF) is negative and significant (p<0.05), suggesting that RMR firms are likely 
to experience fewer incidences of financial fraud or disclosure violations. This reinforces the 
inference that RMR firms have more effective internal control systems. The coefficient of 
profitability (ROA) is positive but insignificant, suggesting profitability is not an influencing 
factor in management’s policy to issue RMRs. The effect of a firm’s frequent issuance of public 
debt (FREQD) on management’s policy to issue an RMR is positive and significant (p<0.01), 
supporting the inference that through RMRs firms attempt to reduce investors’ concerns for 
information asymmetry.    
 
The results of the audit committee variables support the expected corporate governance 
relationships.  The coefficients for audit committee independence (AUDIND) and effectiveness 
(AUDMET) are both positive and statistically significant at p<0.10 and p<0.01, respectively, 
confirming the direct influence of monitoring on management’s RMR decision. The coefficient 
of debt financing (LTDE) has the expected positive sign but lacks statistical significance. The 
ownership structure variables (INSTIT% and MANAG%) have the expected sign, and the latter 
is significant at p<0.10.11 
For the first-time adopters, the results in Table 4 show that the coefficients for FREQD 
and AUDMET are positive and statistically significant at p<0.05. These findings confirm the 
influences of public debt issuance and audit committee effectiveness on management’s initial 
decision to issue an RMR.  All of the other variables except for FREQS and INSTIT% are in the 
expected direction.  The results are largely consistent with those for the total sample.     
 
4.3  RMR Assertions
 
11 To examine the effect of auditing firm “quality” on management’s RMR decision, an analysis of the sample firms 
revealed that over 85% were audited by Big 5 firms. No further analysis was necessary to examine this additional 
factor. 
 
The second objective of this paper is to analyze the contents of the voluntarily-issued 
RMR. It is of great interest to regulators and users of financial statements to understand 
management’s assertions and whether or not they are common across firms. We developed an 
RMR content index of 30 assertions (equally weighted) based on prior recommendations set forth 
by the Cohen Commission (1978), Treadway Commission (1987), the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO 1992), and existing practice. Extending prior studies, (e.g., Willis and 
Lightle 2000; McMullen et al. 1996b), we analyzed each of the 192 RMRs in our sample and 
classified management’s assertions into the following five categories: responsibility for financial 
statements, system of internal controls (and elements), corporate governance, independent 
auditors, and signatures of senior officers. Table 5 lists the coding and frequency results of 
management assertions found in the sample. 
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TABLE 5 
Management Assertions and Frequency in Voluntarily-Issued RMRs (N=192) 
 
Assertions by Category Index
Financial Statements  
1. Management is responsible for the preparation/integrity of the financial statements 92% 
2. The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with GAAP 97% 
3. The financial statements include estimates and the judgment of management 90% 
4. Management is responsible for the “other” financial information 60% 
5. The “other” financial information is consistent with the financial statements 29% 
6. Representations by management are valid and appropriate  4% 
System of Internal Controls  
7. Management is responsible for (or maintains) the system of internal controls 36% 
The purpose of the internal control system:
8. • Safeguard assets 85% 
9. • Execute transactions in accordance with management’s authorization 50% 
10. • Prepare reliable financial information 83% 
11. Inherent limitations in internal controls (reasonable assurance, cost/benefits) 24% 
12. Other limitations in the internal control system (errors, oversight, etc.)  8% 
Elements of the internal control system:
13. • Appropriate segregation of duties or division of responsibilities 31% 
14. • Established guidelines, policies and procedures 52% 
15. • Code of professional conduct/improve ethical climate 30% 
16. • Careful selection and training of personnel 44% 
17. • Monitored by the internal auditing function 79% 
Other Commentary on Internal Controls:
18. • Actions are taken to correct control deficiencies or enhance the system 21% 
19. • An opinion as to the reliability/effectiveness internal controls 41% 
20. • Criteria used (e.g., COSO Report) to assess effectiveness of controls 1% 
Corporate Governance  
21. An Audit Committee exists 96% 
22. The Audit Committee consists entirely of members who are independent (not 
officers or employees) of the entity 
89% 
23. A discussion of the Audit Committee’s role and/or activities (oversight over 
management and/or financial reporting) 
96% 
24. The independent auditors are recommended by the Audit Committee and/or 
approved by shareholders 
34% 
Independent Auditors  
25. An independent accounting firm has audited the financial statements 84% 
26. The auditors have ready access to the Audit Committee 65% 
27. The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 40% 
28. The internal control system was reviewed during the performance of the audit 40% 
Signed by Senior Management
29.
30.
• Chairman of the Board, Vice Chair, Chief Executive Officer, or President                                              
• CFO, Chief Accounting Officer, or other senior officer 
68%
80% 
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From Table 5, the heterogeneity and selectivity of the assertions disclosed by 
management are apparent. For instance, almost all firms (92%) stated that management is 
responsible for the financial statements and 97% stated that they have been prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Yet, only 36% of the sample firms 
acknowledged management’s responsibility for the system of internal controls, only 24% 
discussed the inherent limitations in the system, and 21% mentioned that actions were taken to 
correct control deficiencies or enhance the system.  
 
The results in Table 5 indicate that firms are very selective in the type of voluntary 
disclosures made in the RMR. In each of the disclosure categories, we find that the vast majority 
of the firms disclose the “general assertions,” with the specific and/or detailed assertions 
provided with lower frequency. For instance, in the financial statement category, 90% of the 
firms stated that financial statements include estimates and judgments by management, yet only 
4% of the firms assert that those judgments and representations are “valid and appropriate” as 
recommended by the Treadway Commission (1987) and COSO (1992).  Furthermore, in the 
corporate governance category, 96% of the firms report on the presence of the audit committee 
and 89% on its composition, while only 34% stated that the audit committee recommended the 
independent auditor.  
 
The diversity in disclosure provides additional insight into the activities and effectiveness 
of the audit committee’s role within the firm and is consistent with recent findings on the 
variance between responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters and actual performance 
(Carcello et al. 2002). This diversity in the voluntary assertions contained in RMRs supports the 
mandated and uniform certification requirements in the S-O Act as well as recent SEC and stock 
exchange requirements on corporate governance and expanded disclosure.  
 
To examine the effect of the firm-specific attributes on the actual level of management’s 
assertions, we regressed the content index (CONT) against the explanatory variables of the 192 
issuing firms. We also developed a second “internal control content” index based upon the 
frequencies of management assertions 7 through 20 from Table 5.  The results of the OLS 
regressions in Table 6 show that the influences on each index are consistent with respect to a 
number of factors. The coefficient for audit committee independence (AUDIND) in both models 
is positive and statistically significant at p<0.01, suggesting that independent audit committee 
members exert a strong influence on the content of management’s assertions as part of their 
oversight role. Moreover, both models indicate that RMR content is significantly and positively 
influenced by the degree of leverage (LTDE) and company size (SIZE). Lastly, profitability 
(ROA) is significantly and positively associated with the overall level of assertions.  We ran both 
models excluding SIZE and found the results (unreported) remain unchanged.   
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TABLE 6 
OLS Estimates of Regressing RMR Contents on the Explanatory Variables (N=192)                                                                               
Coefficient (t-value) of Disclosure Scores 
 
Variable Expected Sign
Index of  Internal
Control Assertions
Index of All
RMR Assertions
Intercept 
 
? -0.03 
 (0.32) 
 0.16 
 (2.57)*** 
ICEFF -  0.03 
(1.00) 
 -0.01 
(0.05) 
ROA +/-  0.33 
 (1.48) 
 0.43 
 (2.83)*** 
FREQD +  -0.01 
(0.15) 
 -0.01 
(0.38) 
FREQS +  -0.01 
(1.18) 
 -0.01 
(0.86) 
LTDE +  0.02 
 (2.26)** 
 0.01 
 (2.17)** 
AINT -  0.42 
(1.21) 
 0.26 
(1.07) 
AUDIND 
 
+ 0.25
(3.73)*** 
 0.22 
 (4.75)*** 
AUDMET 
 
+ 0.01
(0.28) 
 0.01 
(0.03) 
INSTIT% +  0.01 
(0.21) 
 0.01
(0.04) 
MANAG% -  0.02 
(0.26) 
 0.07 
(1.19) 
SIZE +/-  0.02 
 (2.16) * 
 0.02 
 (2.79) *** 
F-Statistic 2.95*** 4.23***
R2 15%        20% 
Number of Assertions 14       30 
t- statistics are indicated in parentheses 
*, **, *** Coefficient statistically significant at p<0.10, p < 0.05 and p< 0.01, respectively. (ROA and SIZE are 
based on two-tailed tests). 
See Section 3.3 for variable definitions. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS   
 
For a quarter-century prior to the S-O Act, senior management had discretion in deciding 
whether to publicly disclose its responsibilities for financial reporting.  However, the S-O Act 
has re-emphasized management’s critical role over financial reporting and internal controls and 
heightened the risks of failure to act in accordance with these responsibilities.  This paper 
examines the characteristics and incentives of firms issuing RMRs as a voluntary disclosure 
policy and identifies management assertions included therein.  
 
The results of the study show that RMR issuing firms are less likely to restate their 
financial reports and/or face SEC enforcement actions. These measures validate the positive 
influence of the company’s internal control effectiveness on management’s decision to 
voluntarily issue an RMR. This finding has particular implications for smaller companies as well 
as non-reporting firms (prior to the S-O Act) where more formal or effective financial reporting 
and internal control processes may be absent. Indeed, the SEC is currently studying the 
possibility of relaxing elements of Section 404 reporting for smaller firms and whether or not 
voluntary disclosure may be sufficient. The findings of the study further confirm the positive 
influence of the audit committee oversight on management’s actions. The results also reveal that 
firms with frequent issuances of debt are more likely to issue RMRs, suggesting that reporting 
firms use RMRs to signal the reliability of reported information, thereby reducing investors’ 
information asymmetry.   
 
The analysis of the contents of the sample RMRs indicates management’s tendency 
towards voluntary disclosure of “general” assertions in delineating its responsibilities for 
financial information. However, firms are averse to disclosure of specific assertions such as 
deficiencies within the internal control system, the effectiveness of the system, and whether the 
audit committee recommended the external auditor. Variations in these assertions in a given 
RMR are also influenced by a number of firm-specific attributes such as company size, 
profitability, audit committee independence and degree of leverage.   
 
Further research can be expanded to include other special industries such as financial 
services, utilities, and airlines where particular influences and additional variables are likely 
required. Additionally, a comparative analysis of the contents of voluntarily reported RMRs and 
mandated disclosures under the S-O Act would shed further light on the ongoing debate of 
voluntary versus mandated disclosure.   
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